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A SENSE OF PROPORTION AND
A SENSE OF PRIORITIES:
REFLECTIONS ON THE REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON CANADIAN UNITY
J. STEFAN DUPRI* PAUL C. WEILERt
Cambridge, Mass.

I. Introduction.
The elegantly written Report of the Task Force on Canadian Unity ' is
the most recent product of our constitutional reform industry. In
many respects it is the most impressive. It deserves attention if for no
other reason than the make-up of the group which produced it. The
Task Force was composed of both men and women, politicians and
scholars, persons with experience in the business community and in
the union movement, and representatives of each of our far-flung
regions. Its co-chairmen, Jean-Luc Pepin and John Robarts, are two
of the most experienced and respected public figures in Canada. The
Commissioners toured the entire country. They listened patiently to
often vehement expressions of opinion about Canadian federalism.
At the end of that exercise in constitutional consciousness-raisingintrinsically valuable in its own right-they emerged with a
unanimous Report.
And yet, at least to the two of us, the Report is something of a
disappointment. The Task Force does paint a vivid picture of the
unhappiness that so many Canadians genuinely feel about their lot
within Confederation. It marshalls a formidable array of constitutional recommendations, just about each of which has the respectability of having been endorsed by one authority or other. What we
missed, though, was a detached scrutiny of the current validity of the
litany of complaints. We also missed a critical appraisal of whether
the many constitutional proposals are really responsive to our current
straits. What Canadians most need in our current round of
navel-gazing about Canadian federalism is a sense of proportion
about Confederation discontents and a sense of priorities about
constitutional reform. These we did not receive from the Task Force
on Canadian Unity. Admitting to what were "at times, sharp
* J. Stefan Dupr6, Mackenzie King Professor of Canadian Studies, Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

t Paul C. Weiler, Mackenzie King Professor of Canadian Studies, Harvard Law
School, Cambridge, Mass.
1 The Task Force on Canadian Unity, A Future Together: Observations and
Recommendations (Jan. 1979), hereinafter cited as Report.
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disagreement", 2 the Task Force appears to have opted to compile an
encyclopedia of constitutional reforms rather than separate the wheat
from the chaff.
Such critical notices for this Report might not be terribly
important taken by themselves. This document may pass from the
scene, just as did the Liberal government which commissioned its
authors. What stirs us to write this review essay is our growing
conviction that much the same judgment is i propos of so many of
the blueprints for a new Canada which have appeared on the
landscape since November 15th, 1976. 3 Like so many others, the
Task Force Commissioners felt a profound urge to design a new,
"renewed federalism" before the Quebec referendum whose time is
now being counted down. We think it high time that our constitutional chefs stopped adding more and more dishes to our menu.
Some serious questions must be posed about the entire exercise. Are
our current troubles really attributable to our existing constitutional
arrangements? Will a massive rewriting of the British North America
Act 4 really cure them? And if we do feel compelled to make some
changes-if only as a gesture of good faith to the federalist forces
inside Quebec-upon which of the items now on the agenda should
we place our bets?
II. Confederation and its Discontents.
The nature of the current Canadian Disease has become only too
familiar by repetition. As the Task Force put it, Canada is passing
through a crisis of its very existence, of which the election of the
Partiqu~bcois is just a symbol. These are the major tensions from
which the country seems to be drifting apart:
1. First is the centuries-old cultural dualism between French
and English Canada which has attained a qualitatively different
dimension since the modernisation of Quebec took hold with the
Quiet Revolution. Forces of urbanization, industrialization, mass
education, and secularization have eroded the traditional institutions
of Church, parish, and rural community. For reasons of history,
language, law, ethnicity, collective feelings and political action,
Qu bcois of every description hold that it is the Province of Quebec
2

Report, p. 118.
Among the other documents now in the public domain are Canada West
Foundation, Alternatives: Towards the Development of an Effective Federal System
for Canada (March 1978); Ontario Advisory Committee on Confederation, First
Report (April 1978); Government of Canada, A Time for Action: Toward the Renewal
of the Canadian Federation (July 1978); Canadian Bar Association Committee on the
Constitution, Towards a New Canada (Aug. 1978); Government of British Columbia,
British Columbia's Constitutional Proposals (Sept. 1978).
4 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, as am. (U.K.), hereinafter cited as B.N.A. Act.
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which now bears the vocation of nurturing the French fact in North
America.
2. Added to what is now a full-fledged Qu~bicois nationalism
is a resurgence of regional identification and aspiration in the rest of
Canada. The illusion of many Quebeckers notwithstanding, English
Canada has never been a monolithic and homogeneous entity. In
recent years, the traditional sources of diversity-geography,
history, economics, and ethnicity-have reasserted themselves with
a vengeance, increasingly articulated by the provinces. Many
provincial governments have emulated the aggressiveness of Quebec
in the Sixties in promoting their own regional economies and
societies, and have become bitterly resentful of what they perceive
as federal intrusion upon their plans and prerogatives.
3. At the best of times, a combination of these two centrifugal
forces would pose an intractable challenge to Canadian unity. A
further complication is the ailing Canadian economy. The sluggish
stagflation which has afflicted the entire industrial world in the
Seventies sharply restricts our freedom of maneuvre. As the Task
Force notes, "we can no longer hope to buy our way out of our
difficulties". 5This circumstance helps to detract from the authority
of our national government which is popularly held responsible for
our economic well-being. Indeed Ottawa, the Task Force found in its
travels, "is for many Canadians synonymous with all that is to be
deplored about modern government-a remote, shambling bureaucracy that extracts tribute from its subjects and gives little in return" .6
The Task Force captures the centrifugal forces that are abroad in
Canada about as eloquently and as economically as anyone. To them
the implications of their analysis seem all too clear. The legitimate
aspirations of all the regions, in particular Quebec, are being stifled
by a century-old British North America Act, drafted in a more
centralizing era, and now contributing-or so the Task Force
suggests-to the arrogance of power in an alien Ottawa. A radically
restructured federalism seems like the only answer.
Yet, as we observed at the outset, it is high time we began
viewing these complaints with a sense of proportion. Let us illustrate
what we mean from the case of Western Canada. In the first place,
we believe it was a mistake for the Task Force to subsume Western
Canadian alienation under an undifferentiated sense of English
Canadian regionalism. Within English Canada, Western feelings are
distinctive and politically explosive. The West has its own history,
its own multi-ethnic make-up (neither British nor French in
character), its own industrial structure and political attitudes.
Report, p. 16.
6

Ibid.
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Historically the West has a long list of economic grievances
stemming from its quasi-colonial relationship with the metropolitan
axis of Central Canada. To be sure, a lot of the Western case is
spongy under skeptical economic analysis. Perhaps there is no better
illustration than the time-honoured complaints about the impact of
transportation policy, as some excellent recent work is beginning to
show. I By any yardstick it is the Atlantic provinces which have the
better title to complain about the benefits of an economic union
dominated by "the Empire of the St. Lawrence", to use Creighton's
evocative phrase. 8
But it is Alberta and British Columbia, not Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick, that are calling for radical constitutional change.
Western Canada is increasingly distinguishable from Atlantic
Canada in that the roots of Western discontent lie not in ritualistically repeated grievances, but in the sense of power that commands
an audience. Alberta is unquestionably the richest governmental
jurisdiction in North America. British Columbia and Saskatchewan
aspire to being not far behind. The current population of the Western
provinces rivals that of Quebec and promises to outstrip the latter
comfortably by the turn of the century. With people and wealth, the
quest for political power follows close behind. The lesson of history
is that those who previously were weak but have grown strong
become impatient that "their reach now exceeds their grasp", and
chafe under restraints they previously considered inevitable. That is
what happened to Quebec in the Sixties. The same sentiment is
abroad in Western Canada now. Not only is the West thus different
from Atlantic Canada; there is an element in Western alienation that
is comparable to the Quebec scene even though linguistic dualism
unquestionably makes Quebec unique.
There is no better illustration than the coincidence of Quebec's
Bill 101 and Alberta's Heritage Fund. The former is provincially
legislated affirmative action that seeks to transform the linguistic
face of Montreal. The latter makes available a multi-billion dollar
fund to a provincial government intent on building a secondary
manufacturing base and expanding local financial institutions,
devising its own forms of affirmative action to that effect. So much
for the argument that the current constitution is not elastic enough to
accommodate regional aspirations. There is a subtler irony as well.
These very government measures, both of which are left open to
Quebec City and Edmonton under the B.N.A. Act as it now stands,
See Norrie, Western Economic Grievances: An Overview with Special
Reference to Freight Rates, in The Political Economy of Confederation (1979), p.
199.
8 The Empire of the St. Lawrence (1956).
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may well do more to allay Qugbicois and Western grievances than
all the radical constitutional change that these grievances have led
groups like the Task Force to espouse.
III. The ConstitutionalLever.
We have already taken up the primary burden of this article. Just like
almost everyone else in the flourishing business of reforming
Canadian federalism, the Commissioners have reached too often for
the constitutional lever. Not only do they find things to be seriously
wrong in Canadian federalism, they also assume that we can and
should fix them by rewriting the British North America Act. The
main reason we have singled out the Task Force Report for critical
review is to stake out our claim that constitutional reform should be
the last, not the first, lever in a strategy to deal with the sources of
Canadian disunity.
Ironically the Task Force itself embraces that philosophy when
it deals with one of the most controversial issues on the current
constitutional agenda: language policy. As is well known, Pierre
Elliott Trudeau has devoted his public life-both scholarly and
political-to try to establish in the Canadian constitution a fundamentalpersonal right to use either French or English in dealings with
governments across Canada, a right which would bind not just
Ottawa but also the provinces. Most important of all, that
constitutional principle would guarantee the right of an education in
the minority language in any area where numbers warrant it.
The Task Force which Trudeau appointed has broken with that
approach. A century of history has produced a situation in which
language use and assimilation is going to be territorialin character,
whatever a constitution might say. 9 Thus, the Commissioners argue
that provincial governments must have the constitutional latitude to
deal with the current facts of life about cultural dualism in Canada: in
particular that the French fact is now overwhelmingly the Quebec
fact. Each provincial legislature should have the right to determine
the official language within the province. To the extent that section
133 of the B.N.A. Act stands as a barrier to that aspiration-whether
tangibly or symbolically-it should be deleted, not expanded.
Not that the Task Force was insensitive to the dilemma of two
nations, which, somehow, must be rescued from two solitudes.
Since the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Report," major steps have
been taken to achieve greater degrees of bilingualism among elites in
9 See Guindon, The Modernization of Quebec and the Legitimacy of the
Canadian State, in Glenday, Guindon, and Turowetz, eds, Modernization and the
Canadian State (1978), p. 212.
10Report of the Royal Commission on Biculturalism and Bilingualism (1967).

1979]

Report of the Task Force on Canadian Unity

Canada. After all, how else can we have bilingual central institutions
in Canada, a minimum need for a federal government which hopes to
be legitimate in every part of the country? Having endorsed
bilingualism in the central institutions of the federal government, the
Task Force places its reliance on the political self-interest of
provincial governments to see the need to provide equal linguistic
opportunity for Canadian children to participate in these major
institutions. In effect, the Task Force opts for a strategy of practical
problem-solving, of statutory rights which can be tailored to the
diversity of local situations, of intergovernmental bargaining to
establish reciprocal language rights for citizens moving from one
province to another; with the expectation, or at least the hope, that a
national consensus will emerge "by appeal to the intelligence and
the fairness of the population". Most emphatically, the Task Force
chooses not "to brandish the club of the constitution".' 1
This is the one setting in which the Task Force displays
reticence about the value of constitutional cures. Indeed, having
discarded a constitutional approach to the one fundamental right
which figures so prominently in the question of Canadian unity, the
Commissioners blithely go on to advise us to adopt a
constitutionally-entrenched Bill of Rights. Here is the sum and
substance of the argument they make to connect this proposal to their
mandate. "There is a vital link between the protection of basic rights
and Canadian unity. For only if Canadians feel individually and
collectively confident of their rights can we expect them to display a
positive attitude toward change and accommodation." 12 Further in
the same vein, "a sense of individual and collective confidence in
the security of their rights would contribute to a positive attitude of
Canadian unity". 1'We would not deny that a plausible case can be
made for putting certain basic freedoms beyond the reach of
temporary legislative majorities. The issue is a complex one,
requiring among other things a delicate prudential judgment about
whether our legal and judicial culture has displayed the aptitude for
that charge; and thus whether it merits a higher degree of trust than
our political institutions. Surely though, there has rarely been an
odder claim for a Bill of Rights than the one the Commissioners have
made.
The Task Force does not stop there. It goes on to argue for a
thorough-going constitutionalization of our economic rights and
freedoms. Under the heading of "Unity and the Health of the
Economy" the Commissioners depict an environment "where there
" Report, p. 53.
121bid., p. 107.
131bid., p. 108.
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is constant haggling about which level of government is supposed to
do what, where policies overlap and programs are duplicated, and
where there are growing restrictions in interprovincial trade. 1
• . .most provincial governments have developed a multitude of
regulatory measures, have evolved practices such as preferential
purchasing policies, quotas, and preferential pricing, and have
established marketing boards, all of which have reduced interprovincial trade and therefore the efficiency of Canada's common
market". 15 We agree with the Task Force that the problem is there.
We would like to have had an informed estimate from the
Commissioners of the net loss in economic surplus from the
restrictive provincial policies. We suspect that the aggregate
magnitude would not be that high. Admittedly, the problem seems to
be growing. As the example is set by one cause cO1~bre (Premier
Bennett of British Columbia halting the take-over of MacMillanBloedel by that "foreign" corporation, Canadian Pacific) other
governments are quick to follow suit, (for instance, in the recent
Quebec budget, Finance Minister Parizeau has proposed a tax credit
for investment in shares of Quebec-based companies).
Whatever the magnitude of the problem, the Task Force is bent
on a set of constitutional remedies to enhance our economic union.
In particular section 121 of the B.N.A. Act should be clarified in
order to guarantee more effectively free trade between the provinces
for all produce and manufactured goods, and be extended to include
services. Preferential pricing policies should be permitted only in
those cases "where the province requires them to alleviate acute
economic hardship". 16 Impediments to interprovincial movement
within the profession and trades should be reduced, and barriers to
movement of capital, especially corporate mergers and purchases of
land, should be banned by the constitution.
Hopefully this would expand the size of the economic surplus
generated in our common market rather than divert that surplus to
finance constitutional litigation. On this assumption the Task Force,
eager to insure that the surplus is more equitably distributed among
the several regions than the free market would dictate, seeks to
entrench in the constitution the responsibility of the central
government for the principle of provincial revenue equalizationnow embodied in a complex network of statutory transfers. 17
14Ibid.,
5

p. 65.
Ibid., p. 70.

6

Ibid., p. 71.
Indeed the Task Force is much more ambitious than even that. Over and above
mere equalization of standards of public services, they would make equalization of
17
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With the Commissioners' economic intentions we have no
serious quarrel. What we seriously question is the value of writing
all of this into the constitution. Here are just a few of the questions
which occurred to us in reading this part of the Report.
(i) Has the experience with judicially-enforced constitutional
guarantees of a free market been that happy in federations
which have had them (for instance, Australia)?
(ii) Why is rule by judges desirable for protecting the right of
capital mobility, but not the right to education in the
minority language?
(iii) Is there ultimate compatibility between a free-flowing
economic union and a territorially-based language policy?
(iv) Should we entrench in our constitution the principle of
equalization, and thus hamstring ourselves in making the
adjustments which seem necessary for such sudden shocks
as the OPEC hike in oil prices after the Yom Kippur War,
to say nothing of a new structure of incentives which some
economists feel must be imposed on the provinces to take
some responsibility for tough measures to improve the
lagging performance of their regional economies?"
M

In sum, we simply fail to see why a tack of statutory action, attuned
to immediate practical problems, changing conditions, and diverse
needs, one which is coordinated by reciprocal agreements achieved
thorough executive federalism, is suitable for language policy but
not for economic policy. The Report of the Unity Task Force makes
no effort to tell us why.
IV. "A Restructured Federalism?"
Yet all of the above is just preliminary skirmishing. The flirtation of
the Task Force with constitutional change becomes full-blown
social and economic opportunities between regions an objective of the Canadian
federation. How do they propose to accomplish that? They would take half the
revenues from non-renewable resources and distribute them as block grants to
provinces whose economies had experienced relatively low rates of growth. The Task
Force does not tell us whether that obligation should be constitutionalized as well,
nor, in fact, who would pay for it and how. We are extremely dubious about this
approach. It is one thing to prescribe equalization payments to compensate for
measurable disparities in the fiscal capacity of provincial governments to raise
revenue. It is quite another thing to try to equalize economic opportunities for
individual citizens in whichever province they happen to live. Among other things,
this would deny us the surplus which is gained from economic efficiency when
resources are distributed in the locations where they are most productive.
18See Courchene, Avenues of Adjustment: The Transfer System and Regional
Disparities, in Fraser Institute, Canadian Confederation at the Crossroads: the Search
for a Federal/Provincal Balance (1978), p. 143.
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seduction when they present their conception of a "restructured
federalism." Notwithstanding their disclaimer that they were not
"primarily an advisory body on constitutional issues" 19 the Commissioners observe that "we share the widespread public view that
among the requirements of Canadian unity is the fundamental
revision of the constitutional political structure". 20 They then put
themselves on record about virtually every issue on the constitutional
agenda. It is not necessary for the theme of our article that we
grapple with each of these subjects in detail. Instead we want to
probe beneath the surface of these issues to expose and appraise the
tacit assumptions that inspire such an enterprise, one in which, as we
have said, the Task Force has a great many collaborators.
The first and overriding assumption is that the future direction
of Canadian federalism must be toward a much greater devolution of
authority. There must be constitutional restraints placed on the
exercise of jurisdiction in Ottawa, and a great deal more power to the
provinces, presumably, in the eyes of the Task Force, because
provincial governments are more sensitive to, and the prime engines
of dualism and regionalism.
There are a variety of paths which may be followed to that goal.
One of them is largely symbolic. Under the original "quasi-federal"
understanding of our constitution, the provinces were placed in a
subordinate position to the central government just as Ottawa
remained in a subordinate position to the Imperial government. A
number of relics of that relationship remain in the B.N.A. Act,
several of which have fallen into disuse. The provinces resent these
symbols of inferior status. There seems to be no particular reason
why we should not use this occasion to tidy up the constitution,
complete the transformation begun by Lord Watson, and make the
provinces equal in legal status to the federal government as they now
are in fact. Ottawa's unilateral powers of reservation, disallowance,
and declaration should be removed and the provinces should be
entitled to appoint their own Lieutenant-Governors and Superior and
County Court judges. The last might have benign side-effects on the
evolution of a rational system of administrative justice in this
country. The Task Force endorses this "easy" package of constitutional reform.
The ground gets a little swampier when we approach issues of
constitutional substance: the distribution of legislative authority.
Given the reticence with which the Government of Canada has
approached this issue it is likely that the federally appointed Task
Force felt unusual pressure to declare itself on the subject. The
19 Report, p. 114.
2

Ibid., p. 81.
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response of the Commissioners is nothing if not energetic. It looks
quite literally to the complete rewriting of sections 91 and 92. It
revamps the federal spending power. It invites the discreet
emergence of1 special status for Quebec. It is as exhaustive as it is

exhausting.

2

The central thrust of the Task Force vision of a renewed
Canadian federalism is contained in this passage which depicts the
role they envisage for the provinces:
We see the essential role of the provinces as being to take the main
responsibility for the social and cultural well-being and development of their
communities, for the development of their economies and the exploitation of
their natural resources and for property and civil rights. This implies exclusive
[or occasionally concurrent] jurisdiction over matters pertaining to culture,
education, health, social services, marriage and divorce, immigration,
manpower and training, administration of justice, natural resources including
fisheries, regional economic development, trade within the province, consumer
and corporate affairs, urban affairs, housing and land use, and environment. It
implies as well corresponding powers to tax. Provincial governments should
also have the right, as long as they abide by Ottawa's overriding foreign policy,
to establish some relations with foreign countries and to sign treaties in matters
coming under their jurisdiction. 22

Not content with that range of responsibilities for all ten provinces,
the Commissioners recommend additional powers for Quebec, the
government responsible for the "French fact" in North America:
21 it
may be pertinent to make some observations about the style of
constitutional draftsmanship favoured by the Task Force. Some eminent constitutional lawyers had counseled against a brand new text, cut off from its moorings in
the historic language that our judges, lawyers, and government officials have become
accustomed to over this past century. The Task Force rejected that advice, feeling
that our current arrangements "lack coherence and logical theme", Report, p. 91. As
well, they ignored the suggestion that has been made that the B.N.A. Act suffered
from the "vice of excessive particularity" in the drafting of lists of powers in
sections 91 and 92. The Task Force wants a new Canadian constitution to allocate
government authority among fully seven different lists. As a model for disentangling
government jurisdiction, the Report, p. 92, offers us this draft proposal for
immigration:
"Thus it is now possible to envisage a distribution of responsibility such that
the settlement and integration of immigrants is an exclusive provincial
responsibility, selection criteria and levels of immigration to a province are
concurrent with provincial paramountcy, recruiting of immigrants abroad and
the admission of refugees are concurrent with central paramountcy, and
deportation of aliens and public safety are under exclusive central jurisdiction."
The Task Force tells us that this faithfully reflects what has been achieved in
recent years through inter-governmental negotiations. Indeed it does. We wonder
about the wisdom of taking the outcome of executive federalism at a given point in
time and freezing that into the constitution, leaving that provision to an unknown
destiny in front of judges who have had little or no experience in interpreting
federal-provincial arrangements.
22 Report, p. 85.
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In the case of Quebec, it should be assured of the full powers needed in the
preservation and extension of its distinctive heritage. This would require either
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction, assigned to all provinces generally or to
Quebec specifically, over such matters as language, culture, civil law, research
and communications, as well as related power to 2tax
and to establish some
3
relations within these fields with foreign countries.

The Task Force proposes to protect the scope of provincial power
from subtle federal incursions by drafting new, clear, and, as far as
possible, exclusive jurisdictional lists.
The bemused ordinary citizen may well wonder how devolution
of power to the provinces will contribute to a stronger sense of
Canadian unity. Yet most close observers of Canadian federalism
would agree with the Task Force that a more decentralized
federalism is inevitable-though some are not quite as enamoured of
the prospect as others. The attitude seems to be that if we do not
loosen the reins on these powerful regional forces, the steed might
bolt completely. On this point the Task Force sits quite comfortably
in the middle of the "renewed federalism" camp, flanked by Claude
Ryan and Peter Lougheed.
There is a logic to that decentralizing impulse, one which
emerges clearly if we consider the situation of the Quibdcois in
Canada. They are a distinct minority within the country as a whole.
They now have about the same percentage of the population as at the
time of Confederation. The declining birthrate in Quebec and the
drift in economic activity westward means that Qugbicois can look
forward to less than a quarter share of the Canadian population by the
year 2000. The French Canadians have a profound sense of group
identity and concern about the powers of the English majority fueled
by the historic memory of such crises as the hanging of Riel,
conscription, and the air traffic strike.
Yet we do live in a democracy, founded on the principle of
political equality of the individual: wherever he lives, whatever his
race, language or creed. The institutional expression of that principle
is the procedure of majority rule. In parliamentary government, with
its disciplined parties, the majority really can rule. The government
they elect can get things done, and be accountable to the majority for
the results. In turn, that exposes a minority to a considerable threat.
There is far less chance of building coalitions and floating alliances
on specific issues than there is in a congressional system, in which
political entrepreneurs can take account of the relative intensity of
views about issues that are crucial to a smaller group. It may be
possible to fence out some areas of minority concern, which are
made immune from the legislative majority by being entrenched in a
2

1

Ibid., p. 86.
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Bill of Rights. That is possible only for a limited number of
"fundamental rights," and difficult even for these. And the
Supreme Court, which has the final say about these, must itself
surmount that hurdle of the relationship between the majority and
minority language groups. 24 As to the vast number of day-to-day
issues of government policy, even if the Qu~bgcois minority need
not fear the animus of the majority, it is always exposed to the
majority's insensitivity towards its special needs and concerns, (to
take some random examples from recent history, the strike at Radio
Canada, immigration from French language regions in Europe and
Africa, and macro-economic policies in a country with sharply
25
varying rates of unemployment and growth).
There has always seemed to be one natural response to that
dilemma. While French Canadians are a minority in Canada as a
whole, they are a majority in Quebec. They have a provincial
government in Quebec City which they control as a majority. So let
us assign more and more power to that level of government, to
assuage the feeling of the Qudbcois that they are a beleaguered
minority. Hence the drift to a more decentralized Canadian
federalism ever since the fall of the St. Laurent regime in Ottawa and
the election of Jean Lesage in Quebec City.
Even abstracting for the moment from the plight of the
Anglophone minority inside Quebec, there are evident limits to the
erosion of central government authority as long as we are to remain a
viable country which, presumably, is the aim of the exercise. The
point is subtler and more far reaching than might be thought. There
are powers that a government in Quebec City might want to exercise,
but which it cannot wield nearly as effectively as part of a larger
Canadian union as it could if it were governing a sovereign state of
its own. Take immigration as an example, a subject in which the
special Qudbecois interest is apparent. Suppose Quebec were given
4 There can be no better testimony than the Task Force's own treatment of the
Supreme Court. The Commissioners see it as "crucial that Quebec look upon the
Supreme Court of Canada as a bastion for the protection of that province's
responsibilities for a distinct heritage." Report, p. 101. To that end they propose that
fully five out of eleven Supreme Court judges must be from Quebec (which, recall,
contains slightly more than one-quarter of Canada's population). The Task Force
seems to have cast about for a suitable vehicle among our national institutions to
provide some affirmative political action for the benefit of the French Canadian
minority, and ultimately settled on the Supreme Court as the candidate. A decent
airing of these and other proposals for the constitutionalization of our Supreme Court
requires an article all its own. One of us is now in the process of preparing that for
publication elsewhere.
" The last topic is of growing concern to French-Canadian economists; e.g.
Fortin, Paquet, and Rabeau, Quebec in the Canadian Federation, [1977] Can. Pub.
Ad. 588.
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jurisdiction over immigration to try to attract a much higher
proportion of Francophones to that region, in accordance with the
province's cultural mission. Quebec City would establish carefully
tailored limits and priorities to that end. But the province of Ontario
might follow quite a different policy, opening its borders wide in
hope of attracting a substantial influx of newcomers. Foreigners,
seeing that and wanting to immigrate to Montreal, need simply use
Ontario to do an end-run around the Quebec programme. (We
assume that a minimum attribute of Canada as a single political
entity is that a province such as Quebec could not establish
check-points at its own border to bar interprovincial migration.)
Thus the operation of one province's policy is always capable of
frustrating the objectives of another as long as they are both part of
the same larger nation.
True, Quebec could always enter into an inter-governmental
agreement with Ontario to co-ordinate their respective policies. This
is a lot more difficult to do than to say, at least beyond isolated
instances. That co-ordination would have to be secured among all ten
provinces, each of which has its own needs and priorities, but which
must be won over to a relatively coherent package. If and when
initial agreement was achieved, it would be very difficult to alter it to
adjust to changing conditions, lest the entire scheme come unraveled. Perhaps the major role of a national government in a federal
system, one which exercises direct, independent authority, is that it
can do the job of representing, compromising and welding together
the competing interests of all of the regions of the country, at those
many spots where they intersect.
Of course the illustration we gave of the self-contained arena of
immigration is writ large across the entire length and breadth of
economic policy. Again, a minimum attribute of a modem state is
that it has a common currency, a single foreign exchange rate, a
central bank operating monetary policy, a common market, and a
central fiscal policy impacting on the entire nation. The result is that
economic disturbances originating in one region ripple through into
the other regions which, under a federal constitution, lack the key
economic tools to insulate themselves. We live in an era in which our
economic pain threshold is low. Governments are bombarded with
cries for relief from high unemployment and high inflation. That puts
Ottawa under inexorable pressure to maintain, even to extend the
reach of its economic levers, to try to pilot our balky economy in an
increasingly stormy world. An action that only a national government can take is to protect the citizens of some provinces from the
harmful spillover effect (for instance, unemployment in factories in
Ontario and Quebec) of economic initiatives taken in other provinces
by governments responsible only for the interests of their own
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citizens (for instance, Alberta and'Saskatchewan raising the price of
oil and gas).
There is a possible route out of that dilemma. Why not give
Quebec alone those additional powers? After all, Quebec, as the
home of the vast majority of French Canadians, is the only province
with a special linguistic vocation. The other provinces making up
English Canada can continue to live under a powerful Parliament. As
long as negotiations can be confined to the bilateral level between
Ottawa and Quebec City, there will be no great difficulties in
co-ordinating and adjusting policies (as the example of old age
security appears to demonstrate). That is the route of "special
status" for Quebec, so popular among constitutional elites in the
Sixties.
Unfortunately, in the real world rarely are we allowed to have
our cake and eat it too. Many people believe there are serious
problems with the concept of special status, both in principle and in
practice. As Prime Minister Trudeau was so fond of reminding us,
there is only a limited degree of special authority which can feasibly
be conferred on a regional government as long as we pretend to have
a single national government responsive to citizens everywhere in
the country. If Quebec City is setting policy on immigration,
communications, regional economic development, social security,
and so on for the Qu bcois, eventually the people in the rest of the
country will put the uncomfortable question. By what title do
Quebeckers elect and send to Ottawa Members of Parliament who
help set those policies only for the rest of us-perhaps as the Cabinet
Minister responsible, or even as Prime Minister?
As if in empirical confirmation of that thesis, the Seventies has
brought home the fact that cultural dualism between French and
English Canada is not the only cleavage in Confederation. There is
an increasingly clear divergence between the economic interests of
Western Canada and those of Central Canada. Much more consistently than French Canadians, Westerners have been in a political
minority in Ottawa. As a self-perceived economic minority, they
now feel much the same impulse as the linguistic minority to build up
the authority of the provincial governments that they control.
Whatever differences there may be about the details of constitutional
proposals, there is one profound sentiment shared throughout
Western Canada. If Quebec wins substantially greater authority in a
new constitution to renew Canadian federalism, the West will want
much the same deal for itself.
The Task Force does make a heroic effort to rehabilitate the
special status option, under the rubric of an "asymmetric
federalism". The Commissioners remind us that there are fundamental differences between the size and capacity of a province such as
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Prince Edward Island and that of Quebec, and that Quebec has
always been treated somewhat differently under the B.N.A. Act (for
instance, in language guarantees under section 133 or in the
immunity of its civil law from the uniformity provision in section
94). The Commissioners feel that Quebec does need special powers
.,over such matters as culture, language, immigration, social policy,
communications and some aspects of international affairs" to protect
and develop its distinctive culture and heritage. They warn that "any
political solution short of this would lead to the rupture of
Canada". 26 But the Task Force does not propose to offer these
law-making powers to Quebec alone, and deny them to the other
provinces. That might imply a "privileged" and "favoured"
treatment for Quebeckers. Instead these additional powers would all
beformally available to all the provinces, but under a framework of
interdelegation and concurrency with provincial paramountcy within
which English-speaking provinces would not need to exercise them.
Hopefully these areas would then remain within the jurisdiction of an
effective national government, where, we can assume, the Task
Force believed that they should naturally be located (except for the
special needs of Quebec). Thus the Task Force maps out a
constitutional route under which Quebec would inevitably-albeit
indirectly-become a province qui n'est pas du tout comme les
autres.
That is a fond but rather elusive hope. After all we are not
talking about provinces like Prince Edward Island or about achieving
uniformity in esoteric areas of common law. Rather we are talking
about powerful provinces such as British Columbia or Alberta and
attractive powers such as control over television. If the constitution
were to make available jurisdiction over communication to each
province, politicians and bureaucrats in Victoria and Edmonton
would be sorely tempted by that prospect. They would likely be
egged on by local citizens, who are not terribly enamoured of a CBC
or CRTC which they see as dominated by Toronto or Montreal. We
fear that the Task Force strategy of "asymmetric federalism" really
is a recipe for decentralization to all of the major provinces, rather
than a way-station for special status for Quebec alone.
V. A Different Strategy.
Our readers may be getting rather depressed from this litany. As fast
as the Task Force throws up a new idea, we try to knock it down.
Does that mean that we believe Canadian federalism is not really
threatened? Do we have anything constructive to propose as an
alternative? It is incumbent on us to make our commitments clear.
26 Report, p. 87.
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Obviously Canada does face a profound challenge to its
continued existence. Rarely in the life of any country is a referendum
conducted by the residents of a major region to determine whether
they wish to leave. Clearly Canada is going to be one of the most
decentralized federations in the world. In our judgment there must
also be sufficient play in the constitutional joints to permit a discreet
special status for Quebec, acknowledging the extraordinary circumstances of five million French Canadians beleaguered in the
English-speaking sea of North America.
Where we part company with the Task Force is in the
assumption that the rewriting of the constitution is either a necessary
or desirable means to that end. In our view, constitutional revision
has nothing to do with the referendum and indeed may be
counter-productive. Furthermore, to assume that we could ever agree
on a completely revised constitution flies in the face of our every
experience with constitutional negotiation, and exposes Canada to
the risk of less change than may be desirable. Our history should
teach us the virtues of negotiating changes in legislative policies
attuned to practical problems rather than the staking of abstract
jurisdictional claims, and the need for a finer sense of constitutional
morality exhibited in the day-to-day behavior of all of the
governments in our Canadian federation.
Let us reflect for a moment on the dynamics of constitutional
revision. In the first place, it was and it is totally unrealistic to try to
revamp our constitution to defeat the Parti qu~bgcois referendum.
Any significant constitutional changes require the consent of the
government of Quebec City, politically if not legally. Why would
Ren6 Lrvesque ever agree to meaningful reform which would only
make his sovereignty-association option seem less attractive? We
think it was Donald Smiley who once observed that it is rather
difficult to write the peace treaty in the midst of the war! Nor is
failure to fashion a new constitution just a neutral step. The entire
exercise simply detracts even more from the legitimacy and worth of
our existing document-the only constitution we now have. Then the
Parti qu~bjcois can appeal for swing votes in the referendum
campaign through subtle suggestions that a strong mandate is needed
to show English Canada that Quebec wants truly radical surgery on
the status quo, whether just inside or just outside the federal option.
Of course, on the assumption that the federalist forces win the
referendum, we could then settle down for some truly serious
constitutional negotiating in the early Eighties. That is when our
troubles may just begin. One difficulty we would face would be this.
We have both a murky and an unwieldy procedure for constitutional
amendment. The evolving consensus, tantamount to a constitutional
convention, is that there must be agreement of all governments in
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Canada, federal and provincial, about any major changes affecting
the federal structure. That is a terribly difficult target to aim at: to
achieve unanimous agreement from all eleven governments at one
time, each of which has its own political setting and problems. For
the past half-century we struggled for a new domestic amending
procedure. As the fate of the Victoria Charter showed, Quebec will
not agree to any formula until it has first secured the entire array of
constitutional revisions it feels it needs. Alberta now seems to share
that same view. The trouble is that we cannot secure anything like
those substantive changes until we get a more realistic amending
procedure. 2 That
is the Catch-22 of constitutional reform in Canada
7
right now.
Suppose, perchance, that we did get a new amending formula.
Even then consensus is unlikely. What is the atmosphere at the
constitutional bargaining table? The participants are government
leaders who are embroiled in the day-to-day conflicts of Canadian
federalism. They will want to draft constitutional language that will
clearly disentangle the problems that they have just experienced. We
quoted earlier the kind of detailed language which the Task Force
proposed for immigration. That pales by comparison with the
frightening detail in the draft proposals exchanged by Ottawa and
Alberta about natural resources and interprovincial trade. At the
same time, the wording towards which these governments are
groping is to be entrenched in a constitution. Thus our leaders know
that any commitments they make will be well-nigh irrevocable. And
their troubles in achieving consensus now simply reinforce their fear
that they could never change that language in the future. Naturally
each participant looks for wording which will protect it from all sorts
of "hypothetical horribles" for an entire century. It is a wonder that
we have secured any significant changes in the distribution of
authority in our first century. That we have is the consequence not of
constitutional change but of federal-provincial diplomacy in matters
of public policy.
This is the path we advocate for dealing with our Confederation
discontents. New policies, new understandings, must be pursued
along the modest avenue of legislative change, rather than ambitious
27The Task Force weighs in with its variation on that time-honoured theme: an
amendment formula which by-passes the provincial legislature in favour of a
majority vote of the two Houses of Parliament (one of these a new House of the
Provinces to be described shortly) plus ratification in a Canada-wide referendum
requiring favourable majorities in each of our four regions: Quebec, Ontario,
Western Canada, and the Maritimes. Understandably a lot of Canadians are
fascinated with the subject of referenda these days. Still, whatever the merits of that
device in principle, we question whether, in the existing climate, a formula for an
end-run around a provincial government such as Quebec City or Edmonton really is
the answer to that dilemma in Canadian constitutional change.
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constitutional restructuring. There is no better example than
immigration. This area poses abundant practical problems of public
policy. From a functional standpoint, it is clear that all provinces
have a legitimate concern about the impact of immigration on their
local programmes. Quebec has a qualitatively distinct interest in the
impact of newcomers on the francization of Quebec. At the same
time, Ottawa must have an overriding authority for a variety of
reasons, some of which we alluded to earlier. The sensible way to
attack this problem area in federal-provincial relations is to work out
an agreement which spells out the area of jurisdictional authority and
policy judgment that each side will exercise to meet its needs.
Because that bargain is to be expressed in a written agreement or
statute, rather than in a constitution, consensus is relatively easy to
achieve. Neither party need worry about making an irrevocable
commitment, one which will foreclose its position about matters that
it cannot now anticipate. Each party retains the right to go back to the
bargaining table, and recognizes that the other may also be looking
for revisions as positions change and adjustments are needed.
This is precisely how jurisdictional conflicts in immigration
were sorted out in the last five years. That same avenue has been
generally followed in Canadian federalism for the past fifty years.
While the language in the B.N.A. Act remains largely untouched,
the real distribution of political power between Ottawa and the
provinces has shifted dramatically. In the Forties and the Fifties the
pendulum swung towards Ottawa. In the Sixties, it veered towards
"special status" for Quebec, but in the Seventies the pendulum of
power has swung towards all of the provinces. Perhaps the epitome
of the entire process is the Established Programs Financing Act, 28
whose fallout in our daily lives is now being seen in front-page
stories in the newspapers about Medicare, eloquent testimony that no
solution is a final solution.
In all of the tumult and shouting heard in the federal-provincial
arena, most Canadians miss the message of how remarkably
successful our system of executive federalism can be. For example,
following the shock of the OPEC oil price increase in 1973, and after
some initial fumbling, Ottawa and the provinces did quite a good job
(certainly by American standards) in cushioning the impact of higher
energy costs throughout our regions, in distributing the huge
revenues from natural resources, and in adjusting the equalization
formula to that phenomenon. They performed that task best when the
government leaders stopped exchanging salvos about abstract
constitutional "rights" and got down to meeting the tangible needs
of their citizens. Ironically, the most difficult hurdle was recently
28

R.S.C., 1970, c. E-8.
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erected by the Supreme Court of Canada in its CIGOL decision,"
when the court introduced new and unhappy constitutional doctrines.
That put the touchy subject of natural resources squarely on the
agenda for constitutional reform. As we might have anticipated, the
terrain has proved much harder to explore from the air of
constitutional abstraction, as it were, than on the ground of energy
policy negotiations.
And the latter is the environment in which a decent level of
asymmetric federalism, of statut particulier for Quebec, could be
nurtured. We agree with the Task Force that there are a number of
places where Quebec's distinct heritage and culture do warrant larger
areas of policy-making authority being located in Quebec City:
immigration, communications, social policy, even international
affairs. In a relatively low-key, low-visibility environment, those
areas should be identified. Understandings can be reached tailored to
the immediate problems that are faced and the immediate policies
that are to be pursued. Ordinarily those agreements will last for a
fixed term and will be open to renegotiation as events move on. Most
important, once agreement is reached in an area such as immigration, there is no reason why the same package must be offered to
Halifax, for instance, at least to anything like the same degree. No
more, we might add than that Ottawa must sign the same agreement
with Saskatchewan about off-shore resources as it does with
Newfoundland.
It seems to us that this is a far more sensible route to follow than
the Task Force proposal of a new constitution which will offer an
"open sesame" to all the provinces to exercise these powers; in the
hope-we think a faint hope-that the other provinces will use
self-restraint to preserve a viable national polity. Under the strategy
we envisage, Ottawa would be there as a counter-weight. Before a
province secured additional authority in a particular area, it would
have to persuade the federal government that it needed that authority
to respond to special regional needs.
No doubt all of that will look messily pragmatic, perhaps even
offensive to the canonical mind, especially one as finely-honed as
that of Pierre Trudeau, who did his best to dismantle the incipient
arrangements for a special status for Quebec fashioned by Pearson in
the Sixties. It will be unsatisfactory to those people in provincial
capitals who want to spell out grand theories of constitutional
principle-equating a renewed federalism with more power for
them-and embody these in a new constitutional charter. As well, it
will be argued that we place too much faith in Ottawa's receptivity to
2
Canadian Industrial Gas and Oil Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 545, 80 D.L.R. (3d) 449.
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these agreements, in its willingness to cede its powers to the
provinces if that seems desirable. As to the latter, we simply respond
that if the government in Ottawa has a self-interest in preserving the
unity of the country by healthy doses of regional autonomy, that will
be considerably easier to achieve by these kinds of agreements than
by writing a new constitution. The record of federal-provincial
diplomacy in the last twenty years satisfies us that this task is
perfectly feasible. As J. Alex Corry has so wisely pointed out, what
the country needs now is a lot more day-to-day constitutional
30
morality, and a benign neglect of constitutional legality.
VI. Refurbishing Ottawa.
The burden of our argument has been to stake out a position about the
idealprocess of institutional change within Canadian federalism. We
should add some observations about substance. Some additional
decentralization does appear inevitable in Canada. In places that
would be desirable. It is in order to avoid undue and irreparable
devolution of authority to all the provinces that we would rather see
such changes kept out of the constitutional arena as much as
possible. But that kind of containment strategy will only work in the
long run if our national institutions in Ottawa can somehow be
refurbished and made more attractive. The arrangements that were
fashioned in 1867 were modeled after Britain, a unitary state, and
were put in place by a quasi-federal B.N.A. Act. The emergence of a
new and positive role for government, and the way that has shaped
our party system, our cabinet, our bureaucracy, and the position of
our Prime Minister, have made these original structures increasingly
unsuited to the thoroughly federal society which Canada has
become. 31
We are offered two paths out of that dilemma. One is creation of
a new and different second chamber in Parliament. The most
fashionable version is known as the House of the Provinces
(endorsed by the Task Force under the sobriquet "Council of the
Federation"). This body would give provincial governments a direct
role in governing Ottawa, through a permanent delegation headed by
a Cabinet minister, and on occasion by the Premier. Modeled on the
West German Bundesrat, the House of the Provinces would wield a
variety of suspensive and mandatory vetos, with different majorities
required for different kinds of action. 32 The objective of that new
30 Corry, The Uses of a Constitution, in The Constitution and the Future of
Canada (Law Society of Upper Canada, 1978).
31Smiley, Structural Problems of Canadian Federalism, [1973] Can. Pub. Ad.
326.
32 Unlike West Germany, where a Constitutional Court resolves cases of conflict
between the two chambers, the Task Force places its rather sanguine faith in a
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institution would be to integrate our executive federalism into the
parliamentary institutions in Ottawa in order to "insure that the
views of provincial governments are taken into account before any
central action [is taken] which might have an impact upon legitimate
provincial concerns, thus inducing more harmonious federalprovincial relations' '33
Most emphatically we think that proposal is not a good idea for
Canada at this time. One of us has devoted an entire article to
developing the reasons why.31 We will not use the limited space
allocated to us here to repeat that case. We do make these
observations about the sketchy analysis by the Task Force:
1. We believe that something of real value would be lost if the
Senate were abolished. This is the role of "sober second-thought"
by a legislative body, in contrast with the organ of executive
federalism which the Task Force envisages for the House of the
Provinces. The dimensions of that role are being seriously plumbed
by the Senate in the last decade or two. We can think of few better
tools than the Senate Committee on National Finances to alter
Ottawa's image as a "remote, shambling bureaucracy". It is hardly
likely that would be achieved in the "strengthened committee
structure in the Commons", 35 shaped as that inevitably is by partisan
concerns and party discipline in an elected House. Admittedly the
Senate image of, in effect, "life peerages" should be refurbished,
ideally through appointments for non-renewable terms of ten years,
half appointed by provincial governments. With that caveat, a body
that contains people like Messrs. Roblin, Manning, Robichaud,
Lamontagne, Marchand, Forsey, and Goldenberg, should not be
consigned to oblivion quite as casually as it is by the Task Force.
2. We confess that we are more impressed by the virtues of our
system of executive federalism than was the Task Force, who harp
on its supposed deviation from "normal" political processes in a
democracy. That is why we are so concerned about a constitutional
change which might well undermine the process. The dynamics of.
federal-provincial diplomacy require attention to practical problems
and programmes, delicate negotiations to probe for priorities and
trade-offs, and a federal government which often must switch roles
from a party in interest to a conciliator-arbitrator between clashing
regions (for instance, in the energy crisis we referred to earlier).
permanent committee of the Speakers and selected members from both the House of
Commons and the House of the Provinces, but suggests no way of resolving
deadlocks.
3 Report, p. 99.
34 Weiler, Confederation Discontents and Constitutional Reform: the Case of
the Second Chamber, 1979 Wright Lecture, to be published in the U. of Tor. L.J.
31 Report, p. 99.
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Even now the major breakthroughs and accomplishments more often
than not take place at a private dinner at 24 Sussex Drive. Surely
everything we have learned about bargaining, whether in labour
relations or in federal-provincial relations, teaches us how much
more difficult it is to fashion compromises in an open forum, with
the inevitable temptation to posture for an audience back home. The
Task Force itself seemed to recognize that when it expected that
"much of the preparatory work for the meetings of the Council
would take place through its committees". 3 6 That is exactly how the
German Bundesrat operates. Committees of civil servants stationed
in Bonn do the negotiations and reach the compromises which are
ratified by the politicians in the Bundesrat. How that model would
improve the normal political process of parliamentary democracy in
Canada is far from clear to us.
3. Finally, we are more worried than the Task Force that a
House of the Provinces could be a recipe for partisan obstruction in
Ottawa, thus weakening even further the legitimacy of our national
political institutions. 31 We are also concerned that this idea has been
put on the agenda in addition to, rather than in lieu of, the expansion
of the independent jurisdiction of the provinces. Perhaps an apt,
colloquial translation of the package is that the provinces will say to
Ottawa: "What's mine is mine, and what's yours should be mine as
well!" We are dubious that that is the most sensible gambit in our
current straits.
That is not an objection which can be lodged against a final
issue on the constitutional agenda-electoral reform. Change here
would respond to a significant, tangible problem within Canadian
federalism, and can be achieved without opening the Pandora's Box
of the constitution. The Task Force endorses that idea, the first of
our public reports to do so.
36

Ibid., p. 98.

37 One intriguing feature of the Report seems to recognize the potential for

obstruction in a House of the Provinces of desirable national programmes. The Task
Force proposes that any use of the federal spending power in areas of provincial
jurisdiction must be ratified in the House of the Provinces. But that is done only after
the federal government is given an explicit power of its own to make unconditional
payments to the provinces. That power is the lynch-pin of the equalization
programme which the Commissioners believe is indispensable to an effective and
equitable economic union. Earlier in the Report, the Commissioners intone that
"federal systems are generally more stable and more effective than confederal
systems in which the central institutions consist of delegates of the component state
governments .... Furthermore, a crucial disadvantage of the confederal form of
union . . . is the difficulty such systems have in achieving an effective redistribution
of resources to correct disparities among constituent units". Report, p. 82.
Accepting the cogency of that observation, the Task Force carefully insulates the
federal operation of the equalization programme from scrutiny and possible
obstruction in the House of the Provinces, the very confederal-type body they
propose to clamp on the rest of governmental action in Ottawa.
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Simply put, the problem we face is the disintegration of our
national party system. The Conservatives traditionally win a tiny
number of seats in Quebec (the NDP none at all) while the Liberals
are now faring equally poorly in the West. That disparity reached its
nadir in our most recent election in 1979, when the Tories won only
two of seventy-five seats in Quebec, and the Liberals just three of
seventy-seven in the West (two of these by razor-thin majorities).
Neither major party caucus can remotely lay claim to being
representative nationwide. This fact places the operation of national
government under serious strain in Canada, a fragmented community
at the best of times.
Those visible indices of party support in a region are somewhat
deceiving. Building on the classic study by Allan Cairns, scholars
have shown how our electoral system distorts the true distribution of
party allegiance by region. 38 For example, the Liberals have
consistently polled more than twenty-five percent of the vote in
Western Canada, the Tories more than twenty percent in Quebec.
But our single-member, "first past the post" electoral system just as
consistently translates these sizeable numbers of votes into just a tiny
handful of seats. The resulting disease, once it afflicts party
caucuses, tends to be progressively debilitating. The fundamental
actors in a parliamentary system are the party teams in the
Commons. A caucus with little or no representation in Quebec or
Western Canada may lose touch with the distinctive feelings and
attitudes of these regions. If this lasts long enough, the caucus may
not even be able to assimilate a sudden windfall gain of members: to
wit, the difficulties of the Conservative caucus with the influx of
Quebec members from the Diefenbaker landslide in 1958. Representational deficiencies become self-perpetuating as party organizations
decide to expend their scarce campaign resources-not just money,
but also the leader's time and planks in the party platform-to
concentrate the party's appeal in those regions whose extra votes
have a realistic chance of yielding more seats. We have reached the
ominous position in 1979 in which the Conservatives, while forming
the government, have actually dropped below fourteen percent in the
popular vote in Quebec, almost beyond the reach of a proportional
representation remedy!
The latter is of course the obvious medicine. Nor need we
dispense with our traditional Anglo-Saxon system of local constituency ties between members and electorate. We need simply add to
3 See Cairns, The Electoral System and Party System in Canada: 1921-1965
(1968), 1 Can. J. of Pol. Sc. 55; Smiley, Federalism and the Legislative Process in
Canada, in Nielson and MacPherson, eds, The Legislative Process in Canada (1978),
p. 73; Irvine, Alternative Electoral Systems, in The Political Economy of
Confederation (1979), p. 269.
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that system a number of Commons seats-the Task Force proposes
sixty-which should be filled from national party lists in proportion
to their popular vote. That way, each region would effectively be
guaranteed representation in the party teams which, in the final
analysis, are the central actors in our system of parliamentary
democracy.
That notion has this additional virtue. It can be accomplished
without raising all of the hackles that are customary in debates about
shifts in the balance of power between Ottawa and the provinces. It
does not have to be negotiated and agreed to by all eleven
governments. The difficulties with the constitutional amendment
formula can all be finessed. The issue can be debated in Parliament
by MP's who have had first-hand experience with the election
system, with the role of the MP in Ottawa, and with the distorted
make-up of their party caucuses. If, as we hope, this is an idea whose
time has come, it can be accomplished in one stroke by an Act of
Parliament. Nor could the Parti qu~bcois decently lodge any
objection. After all, electoral reform is an idea they have been toying
with for Quebec itself.3 9
It is fair to observe that the Task Force endorses this idea with a
rather different emphasis than we do. Indeed the Commissioners,
rather than prescribe like a physician who retains hope for the return
of his patient to full health, appear to have approached the party
caucuses somewhat like a mortician who applies his cosmetic skills
to disguise a corpse from the ravages of a terminal disease that has
run its course. A dose of proportional representation can dress up a
party caucus with some semblance of national representativeness.
The road to good health requires considerably more. It may be a
matter, for example, of considering a variation on the Task Force
proposal advanced by Donald Smiley. The candidates awarded
Smiley's provincial seats would be elected not with reference to their
position on a party list but by virtue of having been the strongest
runner-up in the province's electoral districts. It follows that the
provincial MP's from the regions in which a party is weakest start
with at least some proven vote-getting ability as a base from which to
resurrect local party fortunes. Does such a base promise more
likelihood of recovery than high ranking on a party list that might be
entirely composed of individuals with impeccable personal credentials but no aptitude for electoral campaigns?
To debate the point is interesting, but is rendered academic in
the context of the Task Force proposals. The provincial MP's who
" In April 1979 the Hon. Robert Burns, Minister of State in the Government of
Quebec, issued a green paper on the reform of the electoral system, entitled One
Citizen, One Vote.
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find their way into the reformed House of Commons are viewed by
the Commissioners as anything but the workhorses in what must be a
political bootstrap operation if a party's regional weaknesses are to
be other than disguised. Instead, these MP's will find waiting for
them the very functions of legislative refinement and investigation
that the Commissioners' Council of the Federation forced them to
export from the upper house. Why? Because these MP's are free, in
the Commissioners' words, "of constituency problems which
require, rightly, a great deal of attention". 40 Apparently a region in
which party representation has long been deficient does not
constitute a set of constituency problems, or so the Task Force would
have us believe.
There is no better illustration than this of how the Task Force
has let its sense of constitutional inventiveness triumph over its sense
of priorities. They jot down proportional representation on a laundry
list of fully seventy-five constitutional recommendations, many of
which, like their revamped upper and lower Houses, would not live
very comfortably together. We endorse that proposal with quite a
different emphasis. We would use the limited momentum for
renewal of Canadian federalism on this single important reform in
Ottawa: to accomplish a manageable improvement in the representativeness of our major party caucuses, and thus to repair the most
serious flaw in the capacity of our central institutions to contribute to
national unity. For it is the House of Commons-not the Monarchy,
the Governor General, the Senate, the Supreme Court, even the legal
status of our fundamental rights-which we must strengthen in order
to enhance the legitimacy of our national seat of government in
Ottawa.
VII. Conclusion.
In retrospect we have been somewhat hard on the Unity Task Force.
Nothing it says is outside the mainstream of current analysis of
Canadian federalism. In many respects the Report is the most
impressive of the lot.
Still, it is for that very reason that detailed scrutiny of this
document is useful in exposing the set of mind which is widespread
among our constitutional reformers. Canada is enveloped in twin
crises of Qudbgcois nationalism and Western Canadian alienation.
Our constitutional arrangements, centered in Ottawa, are stifling
these legitimate aspirations. Only massive surgery on the B.N.A.
Act can (and will) cure these ailments. It is concerning the
prescription that we cannot be too critical. We think it is a mistake.
There are inherent limits in the degree of constitutional change
which can be digested at any one time. Canadians are not starting
40 Report, p. 106.
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afresh (as were the Americans in the late 1780's). We are not
rebuilding a polity devastated by war (as were the West Germans in
the late 1940's). We have had a century of history, practices, and
understandings in what we dare say ordinary Canadians feel has been
a relatively successful experiment in government, its admitted flaws
notwithstanding. Even if it were desirable-which we do not think
for a minute-it simply is not feasible to rebuild our constitution
from scratch.
Undeniably, there are powerful centrifugal forces abroad in our
country, gnawing at the roots of the Canadian fabric. To the extent
that our political structures are out of joint, and new power-sharing
arrangements are needed (especially with Quebec) these will most
sensibly and most likely be accomplished through Canada's modern
invention of federal-provincial diplomacy: in the form of detailed,
tangible agreements for sharing power in specific theatres of
government action. 4' Meanwhile the aptitude and the appetite for
outright institutional innovation is a scarce resource in any ongoing
nation. For the moment we would invest that capital in a single
important reform: partial proportional representation in the House of
Commons.

41 See McWhinney, Quebec and the Constitution: 1960-1978 (1979),

p. 147.

